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Abstract 
 
The Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) is a multidisciplinary international group of 
aviation professionals that was established to identify possible future aviation safety 
hazards. The principle was adopted that future hazards are undesirable consequences 
of changes, and a primary activity of FAST became identification and prioritization 
of possible future changes affecting aviation. In 2004, the team finalized a list of 
‘Areas of Change’ (AoC), presenting nearly 150 specific changes that could 
potentially influence aviation safety. To verify if the AoCs identified in 2004 have 
indeed become relevant for aviation safety, the FAST analysed worldwide fatal 
accidents that occurred between 2004 and 2014. The results of the analysis 
demonstrate that changes catalogued many years previous were directly implicated in 
the majority of fatal aviation accidents over the past ten years.  
 
 
Keywords: aviation safety, prognostics. 
 
 
1. Backgroud 
 
In the 1990s, the Joint Aviation Authorities, Europe (JAA) and the Federal Aviation 
Administration, USA (FAA) sponsored a number of groups to develop interventions 
aimed at improving safety of the global aviation system. To further this effort, in 
early 1998 the JAA launched the JAA Safety Strategy Initiative JSSI (JSSI, 2000). 
The JSSI mission was the continuous improvement of aviation safety in Europe in 
particular and worldwide in general, leading to further reductions in the annual 
number of aviation accidents and thus fatalities, irrespective of the fact that air traffic 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20190028870 2019-09-26T19:33:50+00:00Z
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will continue to grow. Safety improvements are first achieved through identification 
of causal factors, or hazards, and then taking the necessary steps to eliminate, avoid, 
or mitigate these hazards. Hazards are defined as events and/or conditions that may 
lead to a dangerous situation or events and/or conditions that may delay or impede the 
resolution of such situations. Three complementary approaches are currently used to 
identify hazards that affect safety of the global aviation system: 
 The “Historic” approach is based on accident and incident investigation 
and analysis. It uses proven investigative techniques to discover all facts 
pertinent to a past aviation incident or accident, and thus identify 
opportunities for improvements meant to avoid future, similar accidents. 
 The “Diagnostic” approach is targeted at identifying accident pre-cursors 
within the larger collections of information in various aviation safety 
reporting systems. There are many diagnostic processes in use within the 
global aviation system. 
 A “Prognostic” or “Predictive” approach is aimed at discovering future 
hazards that could result as a consequence of future changes inside or 
outside the global aviation system and then initiating mitigating action 
before the hazard is introduced.  
 
In 1999, the JSSI Steering Group established a dedicated working group to develop 
and implement methods and processes to support the systematic identification of 
these latter future hazards. That group was called the Future Aviation Safety Team 
(FAST) and continues to operate today. The FAST core team includes about ten 
aviation professionals with various backgrounds and expertise from Europe, the U.S. 
and Canada. Over the years of its existence, the composition of the FAST has 
changed but several members (including the authors) have been part of FAST since 
the beginning. In 2004, Bob Kelly-Wickemeyer, Chief Engineer, Safety & 
Certification, Performance & Propulsion (Boeing retired) credited the FAST with the 
originating the forensic-diagnostic-prognostic safety triad described above (Kelley-
Wickemeyer, 2004). This paradigm has since been embraced by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 2013). 
 
2. Areas of change 
 
At the start of FAST, the principle was adopted that future hazards are undesirable 
consequences of future changes, and the primary objective of FAST became 
identification and prioritization of possible futures. The team finalized a list of ‘Areas 
of Change’ (AoC), presenting nearly 150 specific changes that could potentially 
influence aviation safety (JSSI, 2000). In this context, changes must be understood as 
broadly as possible. An AoC is a description of the change, not an identification of 
the hazards that result from the change. AoCs were subsequently prioritized on 
numerous criteria, i.e., nature and scope of the change, any trends or profiles present 
or anticipated timing of the considered change and interactions with other areas.. 
Prioritization was done using the AHP process (Saaty, 2006) in a series of workshops 
with approximately 90 aviation professionals. The AoC that came out of this process 
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as the future change with the highest priority was ‘Reliance on automation supporting 
a complex air transportation system’ (FAST, 2001). 
 
The FAST AoC list is re-audited on a regular basis by the FAST core team. In 
addition, the FAST core team continuously monitors the aviation system and the 
external environment for new AoCs that may arise – so-called “horizon scanning.” 
The FAST AoC list is publicly available on a website hosted by the Netherlands 
Aerospace Centre NLR (http://www.nlr-atsi.nl/fast/aoc/) and currently includes 120 
AoCs. 
 
Transformations affecting the future aviation system come in two distinct categories. 
 Progressive or rapid-onset physical, functional, and procedural changes 
that stakeholders plan for the aviation system with the deliberate intention 
of improving throughput, safety and/or efficiency/economics.  
 Unintentional technological innovation, shifting operational tasks, subtle 
changes in organizations or actors in the system, and contextual factors 
external to aviation itself that can nonetheless influence the robustness of 
the support systems upon which operational safety depends. 
Areas of Change are not strictly limited to the future. They may have begun in the 
past and actually cease at some point in the future. They also may have begun now 
and continue into the future, or be not yet in place but begin at some near, mid- or far-
term timeframe. 
Changes affecting future aviation safety can come from either within the system or 
from events and circumstances outside aviation – the contextual environment in 
which aviation operates. Therefore, aviation stakeholders know some 
transformations, but not others. Those not recognized within the aviation community 
may nevertheless be known to organizations outside aviation. 
Areas of Change are not hazards per se, but may when combined with other 
technologies, operational concepts or related AoCs be the catalysts for new hazards or 
modify the probability or severity associated with existing hazards. 
 
3. Verification of Areas of Change relevance 
 
To verify if the AoCs identified in 2004 have indeed become relevant for aviation 
safety, the FAST analysed worldwide fatal accidents that occurred between 2004 and 
2014. The Aviation Safety Network database (https://aviation-safety.net/database/) 
was used as the initial source of accident information. All fatal accidents involving 
commercial operations with fixed wing aircraft with a maximum take-off weight 
heavier than 5,700 kg were included in the analysis. Military, ferry/positioning, air 
ambulance and agricultural operations were excluded. For each accident, the team 
determined it if one or more AoCs (with a maximum of three) could be associated 
with the occurrence. An association does not necessarily mean that the change caused 
or contributed to the accident. It merely indicates that the AoC was relevant in the 
sequence of events that ended-up as an aircraft accident. In addition to the Aviation 
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Safety Network, the team consulted public and non-public sources such as aircraft 
accident investigation reports, articles in professional magazines (Flight, Aviation 
Week & Space Technology, etc.) to obtain information relevant for each accident.  
 
The total set included 247 fatal accidents. AoCs were assigned to 178 accidents 
(72%). For the remaining 69 accidents, none of the AoCs was considered relevant, or 
a link could not be made because of lack of detailed information about the accident. 
Of the 120 AoCs that are currently on the list, 43 (36%) could be associated with one 
or more accidents. 
 
The nine most frequently assigned AoCs are listed in Table I. Note: the automation-
related AoC that was given the highest priority in 2004 ended up in this top-eight. 
 
 
Table I: Area of Change frequency across accident set (FAST AoC number).  
Area of change Accident count 
Socio-economic and political crises affecting aviation  
(AoC-265) 
48 
Operation of low-cost airlines  
(AoC-125) 
44 
Smaller organisations and owners operating aging aircraft  
(AoC-252) 
42 
Reliance on automation supporting a complex air transportation system  
(AoC-013) 
40 
Increasing operations of cargo aircraft  
(AoC-114) 
39 
Increasing reliance on procedural solutions for operational safety  
(AoC-282) 
19 
Operational tempo and economic considerations affecting flight crew alertness 
(AoC-205) 
16 
Accelerated transition of pilots from simple to complex aircraft  
(AoC-122) 
10 
Decreasing availability of qualified maintenance staff at stations other than 
home base of operations (AoC-256) 
8 
 
 
4. Discussion on most frequent Areas of Change 
 
In the following sections, each of the Areas of Change listed in Table I is briefly 
discussed. 
 
4.1 Socio economic and political crises affecting aviation 
 
The vast majority of the 48 accident aircraft linked to this top scoring AoC come 
from African operators. The high accident rate in ‘failed states’ such as Sudan and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo is unacceptable and should be given highest priority 
by the international aviation community. The strength of the economy of the country 
of the operator is a dominant influence factor, explaining for most of the differences 
in accident rates across geographical region (Visser, 1997). This finding indicates that 
addressing the traditional 'human factor' will not succeed in bringing down accident 
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rates worldwide if the economic environment in which individual airlines operate (the 
'prosperity factor') is left untouched. 
 
Excluding hijackings and external attacks, a mere one in 16 million passengers has 
been killed on the airlines of the world’s 30 wealthiest states and territories during the 
past 15 years (Economist, 2015). Significant changes in aviation technologies, 
functions and procedures even if well-intended need to be introduced with great care 
to avoid destabilizing this safety record. The Aviation Team Looking Ahead at Safety 
(ATLAS) operating under the aegis of the U.S. Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
(CAST) meets regularly to assess potential safety impacts of nearer-term changed 
proposed for introduction in the U.S. In contrast, for carriers of the 30 poorest 
jurisdictions, the rate was 57 times higher, at one in 283,000 passengers. 
 
4.2 Operation of low cost airlines 
 
This group is about small, low cost airlines that operate anywhere between 3 and 15 
aircraft, not the well-established large low cost carriers such as Southwest, easyJet or 
RyanAir. The regional spread of accidents associated with this group is more diverse 
than the previous group and includes two accidents in the US and one in Europe.  
 
Analysis of the 42 cases also showed that at least half of the airlines had one or more 
prior accidents. This suggests that continued airline oversight by the authorities 
appears to be a difficult issue.  
 
4.3 Smaller organisations and owners operating aging aircraft 
 
Aircraft airworthiness is defined by the remaining service life, measured in years, 
flight hours and quantity of take-offs and landings; each assessed independently. This 
is why some aircraft age relatively quickly, due to frequent flights on shorter routes. 
In theory, there is no concept of an ‘old aircraft’ in terms of aviation: it is either 
operable or inoperable. If it is authorized to operate, it should be as safe as an 
absolutely new airplane. Nevertheless, critical knowledge to carry out operations, 
maintenance and inspection of older aircraft types, in terms of know-how and know-
why, appears to be fading with time.  
 
4.4 Reliance on automation supporting a complex air transportation system 
 
In 2004 the FAST conducted a study of the topic, “Increasing reliance on flight deck 
automation” at the behest of the JSSI (FAST, 2004a). This study resulted in 21 
prioritized (out of 286) hazards that were divided in 4 themes: 
 Theme I: Global Air-Ground-Space System Issues 
 Theme II: Flight Crew-automation Interactions Issues 
 Theme III: General Threats 
 Theme IV: Absence of Human Agent (On Board). 
The results of further FAST work confirmed these findings, and also the existence of 
“weak signals”, defined as information which could anticipate an event but remains 
difficult to understand and interpret because of their ambiguous, uncertain and 
fragmentary characteristics (Guillaume, 2011). Examples of weak signals identified 
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by FAST are a) that there will be problems with maintaining “hands-on” currency due 
to future advances in flight deck automation and b) that stress and fatigue will 
increase rapidly when the flight crew does not understand what flight deck 
automation is asking the aircraft to do. This information came from a pilot survey 
among more than 190 respondents, with a mean of 10,000 flying hours and 20 years 
in the business (FAST, 2004b). 
 
Although the increasing reliance on flight deck automation has been a major factor in 
the current favourable safety record of western commercial aviation, the 
misuse/misunderstanding of automation has been implicated in certain high-profile 
accidents, see Table II. 
 
 
Table II: Overview of automation surprise in high-profile accidents 
 
Colgan Air 
Q400 
Feb 12, 2009 
(NTSB, 2010) 
Turkish Airlines 
B737-800 
Feb 25, 2009 
(DSB, 2010) 
Air France 
A330 
June 1, 2009 
(BEA, 2012) 
Asiana 
B777 
July 6, 2013 
(NTSB, 2014) 
Air Asia 
A320 
Dec 28, 2014 
(KNKT, 2015) 
Automation 
surprise 
Crew surprised 
by stickpusher 
operation and 
responded 
inappropriately. 
Crew unaware 
that auto-thrust 
reduction was 
triggered by 
faulty radio 
altimeter. 
Aircraft response  
to control input 
when in alternate 
law at high 
altitude not 
understood by 
crew.  
Crew failed to 
recognise that 
selection of the 
autopilot mode 
cancelled the 
auto-thrust speed 
protection. 
Crew failed to 
recognise that 
pulling the circuit 
breakers in-flight 
keeps the aircraft 
in alternate law. 
 
 
In each of the accidents listed in Table II automation surprises led the crews away 
from appropriate action. It is yet unclear whether revised training - e.g., upset 
recovery training-, new procedures or design changes can prevent the occurrence of 
such cases in the future, because we do not fully understand human decision making 
in unusual situations (Lamme, 2010). The FAST position has been that better 
understanding and research into human behaviour and decision making in normal and 
off-nominal conditions will help to reduce these types of accidents. Such knowledge 
is relevant for improving flight training and flight deck design. 
 
For many aircraft and ground ATC and space systems now in use, there is a lost 
appreciation for the fact that these technology systems will be in production and 
operation far longer than ever conceived by their designers. This in-service ‘inertia’ 
acts as a moderator/constraint to automation evolution. Largely due to airline 
economic factors, the life span of commercial aircraft and their flight decks is known 
to be much longer than commonly imagined. The projected future fleet of more than 
22,000 Boeing 737 and Airbus 320 single-aisle aircraft by 2025 is an example 
(Airbus, 2015; Boeing, 2015). Thus manufacturers may have reduced incentives to 
produce aircraft that push technology/automation envelopes. The same constraints 
will be true for the ground and space “nodes” of the future AGS system under 
development within the Single European Sky Air traffic management Research 
(SESAR) and U.S. NextGen air traffic control modernization programs – both highly 
dependent on automated systems. Increasing heterogeneity will remain a significant 
factor/disruption to be recognized and appreciated. It will also require preventive 
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action. Designers, researchers, regulators, and operators may have left the aviation 
industry long before the last derivative enters service and hence essential information 
on the subtleties of automation design, related training, and operational lessons 
learned may be lost. 
 
4.5 Increasing operations of cargo aircraft 
 
Cargo aircraft are disproportionately represented in accident statistics. Nearly all of 
the fatal cargo accidents in the last decade have involved feeder and ad hoc carriers 
(GAO, 2009). A study conducted by the Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR) and 
the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in 2000 (Roelen et al, 2001) indicated that 
there were 2.5 accidents per million large cargo airplane flights in North America, 
which is nearly five times higher than the accident rate for passenger flights in North 
America and more than twice as high as the accident rate for cargo flights in Europe. 
 
Cargo flights are not required to meet the same regulations as those for passenger 
flights. For instance, cargo airline pilots are excluded from the more stringent flight 
and duty time regulations imposed in the US in 2014.  
 
4.6 Increasing reliance on procedural solutions for operational safety 
 
There is a belief construct that says “we are safe because we followed the rules”, but 
it's not that simple. For example, except for very few aircraft that have special 
protections, safety of flight under winter operations is entirely procedure based.  A 
simple instruction (e.g., perform "a tactile check" on the wings) when in ground icing 
conditions is not enough to prevent accidents. A deeper study is required why certain 
lessons learned – not just winter operations, but also in other aspects of operation and 
maintenance - apparently fade away, and the authorities need to investigate if current 
regulations are indeed adequate. How decisions are made and in what context are of 
paramount importance. We must better understand the interactions among humans, 
technical systems and the overall socio-technical context in which the two operate 
together. This is also where Safety Management Systems (SMS) and mature safety 
cultures come into play (Fox, 2012).   
 
4.7 Operational tempo and economic considerations affecting flight crew 
alertness 
 
Flight crew fatigue is traditionally managed by pilot rest and duty limits. FAR Part 
117, enacted January 2014, was the first major revision to pilot rest and duty limits in 
the US in more than 60 years. The regulations are based on scientific knowledge of 
the effects of fatigue, sleep and circadian rhythms on the human body. ICAO and 
IATA promote fatigue risk management as a means of ensuring that relevant 
personnel are performing at adequate levels of alertness. In an FRMS an operator 
continues to have flight and duty time limitations but these are identified through 
their own FRMS processes, specific to a defined operational context, and are 
continually evaluated and updated in response to their own risk assessments and the 
data the operator is collecting (ICAO, 2011). It is therefore of paramount importance 
that pilots are free to report instances of fatigue. However, an FAA Office of 
Inspector General report (FAA, 2011) found that pilots might not be reporting all 
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instances of fatigue. The report noted that, of 33 air carrier pilots interviewed by OIG 
researchers, 26 (79 percent) said that, at some time, they had been fatigued while on 
duty; nevertheless, only eight pilots notified their air carrier of their condition. 
Among the reasons cited for not reporting fatigue was the fear of punitive action from 
their employers. 
 
4.8 Accelerated transition from pilots from simple to complex aircraft 
 
Worldwide economic pressures to recruit needed pilots for Part 121 operations will 
likely result in more rapid transition of trainees from simple to complex aircraft. 
Current certification standards may need to be revisited in light of this phenomenon. 
Training curricula must provide the skills needed for command of complex, advanced 
aircraft. This phenomenon is evident in proposals for Multi-Crew Pilot License 
(MCPL). Potential concerns are the following (ECA, 2013): 
 There is no relevant Air Traffic Control (ATC) simulated environment 
available to date, 
 The currently approved MPL syllabi meet the minimum requirement of 12 
real landings and even less in some cases, 
 Some currently approved MPL syllabi do not include real Instrument Flight 
Rules (IFR) flight, 
 Some currently approved MPL syllabi do not include asymmetric flight in 
real aircraft, 
 MPL syllabi introduce a global training syllabus timescale reduction, 
including little to no consolidation time (i.e. time to allow for reinforcing 
the just acquired skills, 
 There is a limited sample of MPL graduates flying the line today, 
 There is no proof of capability for a MPL license holder to upgrade to 
captaincy (no MPL trainee has graduated to Captain yet, and no requirement 
for Pilot in Command (PIC) task analysis), 
 There is scarce/limited data feedback on the performance of MPL cadets 
and pilots. 
 
4.9 Decreasing availability of qualified maintenance staff at stations other than 
home base of operation 
 
It is known that technical defects are more often documented in the aircraft technical 
logbook during flights to a home base than during flights away from home base 
(Hakkeling-Mesland et al, 2005). The non-availability of qualified maintenance staff 
at outstations is one of the possible explanations for this phenomenon; pressure to 
complete flights maybe another.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
The results of the analysis presented in this paper demonstrate that changes 
catalogued many years previous were directly implicated in the majority of fatal 
aviation accidents over the past ten years. Areas of Change as utilized in this paper 
form a predictive approach that combines the following dimensions (Cagnin and 
Scapola, 2007):  
 Look forward, e.g. through forecasting, trend analysis, gaming and 
scenarios, futurist writing, etc.  
 Look across, e.g. through systemic thinking across multiple domains that 
reflect technology convergence.  
 Look backwards, through historical analogy, previous future-oriented 
studies, trend, analysis, etc. History is important, although it shouldn’t be 
the sole basis for the identification and analysis of future risks. 
 Finally, there also needs to be a) a concerted effort “to prepare” the 
recipient of the prognostic message(s) and b) continued processing of 
signalled problems in a follow on team. This is an essential strategy for 
success. 
 
One major difficulty with the assessment of future risks is to predict the future system 
with enough certainty and provide a good, complete and trustable description of the 
future.  Although the future can never be entirely predicted, certain changes are likely 
to happen, such as the introduction of 4D trajectory management and System Wide 
Information Management (SWIM) into Air Traffic Management. These ‘solid’ 
elements can then be combined with less certain elements (e.g. demographics, fuel 
price changes, socio-technical-cultural factors, etc.) to form various scenarios from 
collections of future changes.  
 
Collections of changes affecting aviation such as maintained by the FAST can be 
important catalysts for assessment of the following predictive safety questions: 
1. How do the Areas of Change, in isolation or in combination, introduce or affect 
the hazards and risks from traditional system safety assessments?  
2. Are there novel emergent hazards generated by interactions between and among 
AoCs that could adversely impact the safety characteristics of the future system 
being assessed? Interactions among these future changes –may weaken critical 
functions that must be maintained to ensure safe operations. Critical functions 
are defined as potential pathways leading to successful management of 
emerging risk rather than simply preventing failure. Assessments that do not 
appreciate or reflect the consequences of interaction complexity will not be 
fully informative and can lead to inappropriate trade-offs and increases in other 
risks (IRGC, 2010). 
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3. How do the Areas of Change, in isolation or in combination, affect the 
robustness or resilience of the risk controls (barriers) being considered? 
4. The use of AoCs provides a different view on accidents as they happen 
worldwide since it triggers questions like a) how does the industry ensure 
information availability for operations, maintenance & overhaul, b) if human 
factors work will not bring down world-wide accident rates in view of the 
economic environment, we should review and consider change to the current 
safety efforts addressing e.g. ‘loss of control’ accidents.  
5. Are there weak signals that should be acted upon?  
 
Areas of Change help an analyst adopt a prospective mind-set: an ability to project 
oneself into the future; i.e. reflect within a framework that is unknown or uncertain. 
Many FAST Areas of Change that were identified in 2004 are correlated with the 
examined set of fatal accidents over the past ten years. The “Prognostic” or 
“Predictive” approach so in vogue these days aims to uncover such correlations, and 
the present analysis demonstrates the value of such a look-ahead. Examining future 
changes enables discovery of future hazards by using collections of change inside or 
outside the global aviation system. Once such hazards have been identified, 
mitigating actions can be initiated before the hazard appears. Prognostic hazard 
identification informs design processes so that the hazards can be eliminated from the 
future, avoided in the future, or mitigated in the future. The FAST Areas of Change 
inventory will be a great help in this endeavour. 
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